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Communitizing Transnational Regulatory Concerns
Sungjoon Cho, Jacob Radecki, and Cecilia Suh

Abstract
The conventional, rationalist view explains that a state will only assent to international
regulation if such regulation directly serves the state’s interest. In contrast, nascent transnational
regulatory intermediaries, such as the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Technical Barriers
to Trade (TBT) Committee, seek to ameliorate such parochial state interests through a broader
interstate dialogue. This Article addresses the challenging question of whether these intermediaries
have any meaningful effect on the resolution of interstate trade disputes. To examine this question,
this Article utilizes data from over 400 examples of “specific trade concerns” (STCs) raised by
WTO members in the TBT Committee. Our statistical analysis demonstrates that
confrontational (legal) inquiries, as opposed to inquiries seeking clarification, regarding members’
technical regulations tend to reduce the likelihood of the resolution of underlying disputes. Our
findings suggest that the way regulatory problems are discussed, and thus communitized, affects
the way that parties ultimately reconcile. This Article closes with a call for more qualitative
research methods, such as interviewing TBT Committee participants, to further explore the
complexities inherent in the new communitized transnational regulatory environment.

Table of Contents
I. Introduction............................................................................................................... 50
II. Problematizing Transnational Regulatory Governance..................................... 55
III. Toward a Theory of Transnational Regulatory Communitization ................. 60
A. Transnational Regulatory Intermediaries (TRI) ............................................. 61


Sungjoon Cho is a Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Jacob Radecki is an Associate
at Levin & Perconti. Cecilia Suh is an Associate at Funkhouser Vegosen Liebman & Dunn. We
thank Claire Kelly, Kenneth Abbott, Duncan Snidal, David Levi-Faur, Timothy Lytton, Joel
Trachtman and participants of SASE Regulatory Intermediaries Workshop in London and the
WTO 20 Conference at Harvard Law School for their helpful feedback. Kathleen Mallon provided
excellent research assistance.

48

Communitizing Transnational Regulatory Concerns

Cho, Radecki, & Suh

B. TRI and International Regulatory Communitization .................................... 64
IV. A Case Study: The WTO TBT Committee ....................................................... 66
A. Measuring the Effectiveness of a Transnational Regulatory Intermediary 66
B. The Data ............................................................................................................... 69
C. Analysis ................................................................................................................. 73
D. Explanations and Projections ........................................................................... 81
V. Conclusion................................................................................................................ 82

Summer 2017

49

Chicago Journal of International Law

I. I NTRODUCTIO N
In this Article we argue that the conventional command-and-control
theories related to regulatory requirements fall away in the face of transnational
regulatory governance. We therefore seek a new explanatory model that prioritizes
and recognizes the discursive nature of international regulatory proceedings.
Importantly, we contend that the way regulatory problems are discussed, and thus
the way they are communitized, affects the way parties ultimately reconcile
regulatory disputes. We conclude that collaborative and less confrontational
regulatory exchanges tend to be significantly more successful than formal and
inquisitive ones.
Globalization has added a transnational layer of complication to the
conventional regulatory dyad of regulator (rule-maker) and regulatee (rule-taker).
Suppose that the Australian government regulates the proper labeling and
packaging of tobacco products. It requires all cigarettes marketed in Australia to
be packaged in a plain, standardized form without any branding, such as logos and
images; however, the package must include a serious health warning.1 Also
suppose that Ukrainian cigarette exporters refuse to comply with the labeling
(packaging) requirement on the grounds that such a draconian rule is an
unnecessary trade restriction and therefore violates the World Trade
Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Here,
two regulatory relationships interface with each other. First, Ukrainian cigarette
exporters, the rule-takers, are supposed to abide by the tobacco labeling
requirement enacted by Australia, the rule-maker. Second, Australia, as rule-taker,
must comply with WTO norms, such as the TBT Agreement, a rule-maker.
Ukraine, on behalf of its cigarette exporters, may question Australia’s tobacco
labeling regulation by invoking Australia’s obligations under the TBT.2
Thus, the conventional view of the regulatory process as a two-way game
envisions two separate governance structures—domestic and international.
Typically, both states and private businesses qua rule-takers will comply with rules
if, and only if, behaving (compliance) is in their interest, or if violating (noncompliance) would entail certain disutilities, such as a penalty.3 Applying the
conventional model to the aforementioned hypothesis, Ukraine cigarette
1
2

3

Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Act No. 148, 2011) (Austl.).
See Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements
Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, Request for Consultation, DS434 (Mar. 13, 2012).
Claire R. Kelly, Realist Theory and Real Constraints, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 545, 585–87 (2004); Kenneth W.
Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 424–26
(2000); Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of
International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 345, 350–56 (1997); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based
Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1860–61 (2002). Regarding the critique on the
conventional (rationalist) approach to compliance, see generally SUNGJOON CHO, THE SOCIAL
FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD TRADE: NORMS, COMMUNITY AND CONSTITUTION, 120–63 (2015).
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exporters would likely elect to defy the Australian labeling requirement if
compliance is too costly to them and their business partners, such as Philip Morris,
who built cigarette factories in Ukraine. Likewise, in the event that the WTO
invalidates Australia’s labeling requirement, Australia would likely agree to repeal
the measure if a potential sanction is too painful to bear.
While the conventional view offers a simple yet powerful heuristic on
regulatory governance, that view fails to embrace more nuanced aspects of
regulatory relationships. The conventional preoccupation with law as coercion
(enforcement) tends to dismiss important non-material dimensions of WTO
norms, such as their rhetorical power. In other words, the two-way game
regulatory model does not capture various discursive pathways provided by a
regulatory intermediary. A regulatory intermediary, such as the TBT Committee,
connects the domestic and international regulatory spheres and helps build a
“compliance community” by hosting regulatory dialogue in a transnational
setting.4
The ultimate rationale of the TBT Agreement is to achieve ostensibly
conflicting goals of free trade and regulatory autonomy in a non-entropic,
harmonious manner.5 A number of “procedural” disciplines under the TBT
Agreement, such as transparency, notification, and reason giving, are geared
toward these dual goals.6 These procedural disciplines are meta-regulation in that
they regulate how each WTO member regulates in the domestic sphere. In this
regard, the TBT Committee, in particular through specific trade concerns (STCs),
provides a communal forum in which WTO members conduct peer review on
other members’ domestic regulations in accordance with these procedural
disciplines.7 The operational logic of the TBT Committee is not so much coercion
as it is discourse by design. In other words, the TBT Committee provides both
exporting countries that usually share the goal of free trade and importing
4

5

6

7

Regarding the “compliance community,” see generally, KAREN ALTER, THE EUROPEAN COURT’S
POLITICAL POWER: SELECTED ESSAYS (2009); BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009); Laurence R. Helfer & Eric Voeten,
International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe, 68 INT’L ORG. 77
(2014).
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120, pmbl. [hereinafter TBT
Agreement]; see also Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving Beyond the Entropic
Dilemma, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 625 (2005).
See SUNGJOON CHO, THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD TRADE, supra note 3, at 120–63;
Sungjoon Cho, Of the World Trade Court’s Burden, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 675 (2009); Sungjoon Cho, From
Control to Communication: Science, Philosophy and World Trade Law, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 249 (2011)
[hereinafter Cho, From Control to Communication].
See Sungjoon Cho, How the World Trade Community Operates: Norms and Discourse, 13 WORLD TRADE
REV. 685, 700 (2014) (observing that the institutionalization of peer review under the TBT
Agreement requires WTO members to defend the legality of their regulatory positions if challenged)
[hereinafter Cho, Norms and Discourse].
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countries that often represent the value of regulatory autonomy with unique
discursive opportunities to engage in learning, perspective taking, mutual
persuasion, and eventually the development of non-binary regulatory solutions.8
The logic of discourse can be warranted particularly by the indeterminate nature
of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), which restrict the flow of goods and services
through means other than tariffs, and the inevitable governance gap they create.
The reciprocal bargaining model prevalent in conventional trade negotiation
simply does not work in tackling these NTBs, which are fraught with
irreconcilable socio-cultural differences among trading nations.9 In this regard, the
STCs mechanism under the TBT Committee has been broadly popular among
WTO members in terms of frequency of its invocation.10 Yet its success, as well
as the meaning of such success, still remains unarticulated. This Article attempts to
both conceptualize and measure the success of the STCs mechanism.
In the preceding example, the TBT Committee may provide a forum in
which Ukraine, on behalf of its domestic regulatees, cigarette exporters, may
demand a justification from Australia for the latter’s labeling regulation.11 Ukraine
may argue that the Australian labeling regulation lacks the scientific justification
required under the TBT Agreement.12 It is, however, important to note that the
WTO, in and of itself, is not a “world government.” The WTO cannot simply
legislate away regulatory heterogeneity. Instead, peer review under a regulatory
intermediary (the TBT Committee) promotes regulatory dialogue between
regulators and regulatees. Such regulatory dialogue tends to result in both
countries familiarizing themselves with each other’s regulatory regime. This
mutually enhanced awareness between regulators and regulatees as well as the
consequent regulatory cooperation is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for
any regulatory solution.
It remains an empirical, albeit often extremely complicated, question
whether such a regulatory intermediary—the TBT Committee—is “effective,” in
other words, whether it actually delivers any practical solution for the original
8

9
10

11

12

In this Article, a “binary” regulatory solution refers to a dichotomy of compliance and
non-compliance (violation) in terms of regulatees’ behavioral responses based largely on utilitarian
considerations, such as incentives and penalties. It epitomizes a conventional regulatory framework
under international law. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See SUNGJOON CHO, THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD TRADE, supra note 3, at 120–63.
See Bryce Baschuk, WTO Panel Considers 500th Specific Trade Concern, INT’L TRADE DAILY (Bloomberg
BNA), Mar. 11, 2016, available at https://perma.cc/WG4P-2TNX.
See Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (WTO), Minutes of the Meeting of June 15–16, 2011,
G/TBT/M/54 (Sep. 20, 2011) (discussing Australia–Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011
(G/TBT/N/AUS/67)).
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement requires WTO Members to consider available scientific and
technical information when preparing technical regulations. “In assessing such risks, relevant
elements of consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical information, related
processing technology or intended end-uses of products.” TBT Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 2.2.
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regulatory dilemma. Confronted by these measurement challenges, one possible
option might be to assess a regulatory intermediary’s effectiveness through various
interactions (inquiries and responses) within the TBT Committee and their
consequences. Note that these consequences do not necessarily mean any
dramatic behavioral changes toward compliance. They may also include
expressions of satisfaction, explicit or implicit, from inquirers. If the regulating
country’s response indeed satisfies the original inquirer, there will be no more
discussion or dispute. In this regard, the TBT Committee is a regulatory
“clearinghouse” that channels and manages TBT-related inquiries that exist in the
form of both a demand for clarification and a complaint about alleged illegality.
Unlike adjudication through the WTO tribunal, the ultimate goal of the TBT
Committee is to liquidate those demands or complainants by providing a
discursive forum. As those STCs are circulated, shared, and peer-reviewed
(“communitized”) within the TBT Committee among whichever WTO members
are interested,13 WTO members may familiarize themselves with the regulatory
practices of their trading partners, better appreciate similarities and differences in
regulatory approach on the same issue area, and therefore expand both shared
regulatory grounds and a zone of regulatory tolerance. In this sense, the TBT
Committee may function as a critical dispute “prevention” mechanism.
Against this background, our study investigates the TBT Committee data
spanning the past twenty years. This study aims to achieve two main goals. First,
it conceptualizes the WTO’s TBT Committee as an intermediary that assists
regulatory compliance by facilitating regulatory dialogue in a transnational setting,
crisscrossing domestic and international regulatory jurisdictions. Second, the study
measures the effectiveness of such a regulatory intermediary by analyzing TBT
Committee data for the past two decades.
The TBT Committee data concerns over 400 “specific trade concerns”
(STCs) raised during the Committee meetings since the launch of the WTO
system in 1995. We analyzed minutes of those meetings based on various patterns
of interactions among WTO members in the TBT Committee, such as a
clarification (fact-finding) request, a complaint questioning the legality of the
measure in question, a response satisfying the inquiring country, and a vague
response. We then developed the following hypotheses:
1.
The higher the level of conflict an STC demonstrates, defined by the
number of WTO members involved, the less likely it is to be eventually
resolved or satisfied;
2.
The more frequently WTO members discuss a particular regulatory
issue (STC), the less likely it is to be eventually resolved or satisfied; and
13

Before the TBT Committee, any WTO member may challenge or request clarification on new
technical regulations (“specific trade concerns”) notified and publicized under the “Technical
Barriers to Trade Information Management System (TBT IMS).” WTO, TBT Information
Management System, available at https://perma.cc/3UXM-YLHE.
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3.
A clarification request is more likely to produce a resolution or
satisfaction than an illegality complaint.

After we completed coding the data, we evaluated these hypotheses. While
the full statistical method and results are discussed in detail below, a brief summary
follows. Ultimately, our data supports our hypotheses with respect to hypotheses
(2) and (3), but does not support hypothesis (1). Our analysis supports significant
statistical change in Resolution based on Frequency and Motivation. Ultimately,
we conclude from the data that for each increase in Frequency, the likelihood of
Resolution is reduced by approximately 2 percent. Intriguingly, each Legality
inquiry is associated with an approximately 20 percent reduced likelihood of
Resolution. These relationships are not strongly correlated, but they do evince the
trend discussed in the hypotheses.14
Perhaps most interestingly, this analysis shows us how much we do not
know, and cannot measure by merely evaluating, summarizing, and coding
publicly available resources such as WTO and TBT committee meeting minutes.
For example, we coded the Motivation variable using TBT meeting minutes. In
doing so, we took into account the specific phrasing used in the minutes as well
as the general “tone” of an inquiry to determine whether a complaint was primarily
one of legality or clarification. These inquiries might be further complicated by
the pre-existing relationship between States. It might be similarly complicated by
the relationships among State representatives as well as between State and WTO
staff. As is perhaps obvious, State-to-State—and subordinately, human-tohuman—interaction is endlessly variant while remaining cumulative and iterative.
Thus, the TBT Committee discourse can be highly complex. In this regard, our
present data analysis demonstrates the potential challenge in presuming a
rationalist model,15 which too often is based on monolithically prescriptive and
proscriptive ideas related to regulatory governance. Instead, the complexity
inherent in the interstate dialogue reflected by the TBT Committee minutes
illustrates the need for more information and a more nuanced approach to
evaluating regulatory intermediaries. Consequently, we will need to further
contextualize this result by interviewing diplomats and WTO staff who actually
14

15

“Resolution” refers to a situation in which both an inquiring party and a responding party reached
a certain solution or agreement, explicit or implicit, regarding the original specific trade concern.
“Frequency” indicates the total number of rounds of meetings of the TBT Committee in which the
identical trade concern was raised. “Motivation” concerns the reasons behind the original inquiry:
it can be either to challenge the WTO-consistency of the technical regulation in question
(“Legality”) or to seek clarification of the content of such regulation (“Clarification”). Regarding
further details on the definitions of these variables, see infra Section IV.
The rationalist model of international trade presumes that, given the anarchic world order, WTO
members participate in the WTO for the sole purpose of advancing their national interests and will
eschew compliance when compliance is inconvenient. This view aligns neatly with the realist, binary
view of international politics. See generally SUNGJOON CHO, THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD
TRADE, supra note 3, at 49–59.
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participated in the TBT Committee meetings. This will enable us to gather more
data and information related to the discursive processes inherent in the WTO
generally and the TBT committee specifically.
In sum, this Article generates two broad implications. First, just as
Newtonian-Einsteinian physics cannot explain ninety-five percent of the universe
that consists of dark energy and dark matter, the conventional, rationalist model
cannot fully capture complex state regulatory behaviors without probing the
discursive and rhetorical exchanges that occur among states. Second, as NTBs
have increasingly replaced traditional tariff barriers, conventional analytical
models based on simplistic behavioral assumptions, such as utility maximization,
can no longer effectively explain NTBs. This follows from the fact that most
NTBs are embedded in local socio-cultural characteristics. Obviously, these types
of NTBs may not necessarily be simply bargained away through a reciprocal giveand-take.16 Under these circumstances, communication must be prioritized over
incentives when mediation between state parties occurs.
This Article proceeds as follows: Section II problematizes the conventional
approach to international regulatory governance by spotlighting its rather
monolithic assumption on the regulator-regulatee relationship based on a
rationalist model. Although this regulatory conventionalism brings causality into
relief, it largely fails to capture the rich social dynamic between regulators and
regulatees. In response, Section III explores an alternative model of regulatory
governance in terms of “regulatory intermediaries.” Section III then attempts to
theorize “communitization” of international regulation. Section IV tests the
theory of international regulatory communitization by applying it to the TBT
Committee. The Article concludes that, while the effectiveness of the TBT
Committee is not unlimited, it certainly signifies an innovative type of
transnational regulatory governance.

II. P ROBLEMATIZING T RANSNATIONAL
R EGULATORY G OVERNANCE
International organizations (IOs), such as the WTO, suffer from a chronic
mismatch between their ambitious goals and deficient capacities.17 These capacity
deficiencies come in diverse forms. Most of all, sovereign countries are reluctant
to grant direct and hierarchical regulatory authority to IOs. 18 Likewise, most IOs
16
17

18

See generally Cho, From Control to Communication, supra note 6.
See Kenneth W. Abbott et al., Orchestration: Global Governance through Intermediaries 2 (Aug. 2012),
https://perma.cc/XD94-GQY8 (observing that international organizations “often lack the
capabilities to perform the roles they have been nominally allocated”).
Id. at 20 (“States are more likely to impose strict control on IGO independence in core areas of
national sovereignty.”).
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lack adequate financial resources with which to hire and invest more in their
corresponding regulatory areas to fulfill their mandates. While this material
capacity gap within IOs has been widely discussed, another important gap, a
“governance gap,” has been relatively underexplored and under-theorized.19 Part
of the reason behind this paucity is the predominance of the conventional
regulatory framework, which can be epitomized as a hierarchical, compliancebased model.20 It is based on a very strong assumption that a regulator is capable
of directly formulating and executing regulatory policies vis-à-vis regulatory
targets.21 Naturally, conventional studies on regulation also tend to highlight the
rationalist dimension of effectiveness of, and compliance with, a given regulation,
such as enforcement strategies.22 Here, regulatees are often viewed as “amoral
calculators.”23 The conventional view related to amoral calculators, which is
informed by neorealists and rational choice theorists, posits that a state would
comply with regulatory treaties if, and only if, such compliance contributes to its
utilities (material interest, power, or reputation) or avoids disutilities, such as
sanctions.24
In the modern era, while globalization increases interdependency among
nations, a domestic regulatory authority might still not have effective access to
relevant regulatory targets in foreign jurisdictions.25 In this complicated
transnational regulatory situation, the conventional assumption does not hold and

19

20

21
22

23

24

25

Regarding notable exceptions, see Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle:
Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in WALTER MATTLI & NGAIRE WOODS, THE
POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 44–88 (2009); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD
ORDER (2004); WOLFGANG H. REINICKE, GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY: GOVERNING WITHOUT
GOVERNMENT? (1998); James N. Rosenau, Governance in the Twenty-first Century, 1 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 13–43 (1995).
Under the conventional hierarchical regulatory model, “regulation is largely prescriptive and
compliance is largely based on coercion, deterrence and sanctions.” Kenneth W. Abbott, David
Levi-Faur, & Duncan Snidal, Intermediaries in Regulatory Governance (Feb. 4, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors), at 1. In the American context, the conventional model was
typified by a “control-and-command structure,” which is inappropriate and wholly unworkable in
the voluntary-compliance arena of international relations. See Orley Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall
of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, SAN DIEGO LEGAL STUDIES PAPER
NO. 07-27 (2004).
Abbott, Levi-Faur & Snidal, supra note 20, at 4–5.
Susan S. Silbey, Case Processing: Consumer Protection in an Attorney General's Office, 15 L. & SOCIETY REV.
849 (1981).
Robert A. Kagan & John T. Scholz, The “Criminology of the Corporation” and Regulatory Enforcement
Strategies, in KEITH HAWKINS & JOHN M. THOMAS, ENFORCING REGULATION 67–95 (1984).
See SUNGJOON CHO, THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD TRADE, supra note 3; Kenneth W.
Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law, supra note 3, at 430.
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Taking Responsive Regulation Transnational: Strategies for
International Organizations, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 95, 96 (2013).
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therefore could not remedy the aforementioned mismatch.26 This conventional
approach is particularly questionable in light of the WTO’s nature and design visà-vis regulatory action. In particular, the TBT committee is shielded from the IO
design tendency to “institutionalize[ ] the nature of states’ control mechanisms,
such as the frequency with which government representatives convene for
oversight meetings.”27 Instead, as part of what Tana Johnson terms “IGO
[intergovernmental organization] progeny,”28 the TBT’s subsidiarity relative to the
WTO provides it with greater institutional authority and latitude. This is because,
as Johnson contends, international bureaucrats factor into the design of regulatory
IOs in ways that alter the typical cycle of State rationalism.29 In this sense, these
international bureaucrats subvert the conventional command-and-control
structure in favor of an increasingly discursive one. This tendency was built into
the TBT committee in particular and many regulatory IOs generally.30 As such,
international bureaucrats have “dampened formal mechanisms of state control,” 31
evincing the important role played by these bureaucrats within their organization.
In sum, the conventional view simply brackets another important dimension of
regulatory governance in which a regulatee state’s action is guided not simply by
calculation but by socialization. This socialization includes learning and persuasion
often provided by international bureaucrats and other soft institutions including
the TBT Committee.
Likewise, the conventional view often regards the WTO as a “contract”
between Member States subject to ordinary rules of damages like efficient
breach.32 However, the conventional view tends to misrepresent the genuine
nature of compliance under the WTO system. For example, compliance can be
viewed as having a dual nature embodied in first and second order compliance.
First order compliance is similar to contractual remedy conceptualized by the
conventional model, while second order compliance relates to the systematic

26

27

28
29
30

31
32

Abbott, Levi-Faur, & Snidal, supra note 20, at 4–5. “Business is increasingly global, operating
through affiliates in multiple countries, lengthy and opaque transnational supply chains, and other
complicated structures that span regulatory boundaries.” See also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 25, at
96.
TANA JOHNSON, ORGANIZATIONAL PROGENY: WHY GOVERNMENTS ARE LOSING CONTROL OVER
THE PROLIFERATING STRUCTURES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 4 (2014).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 5.
See Cho, Norms and Discourse, supra note 7, at 700–702 (discussing the “peer review” mechanism
under the WTO system, including the one conducted within the TBT Committee).
JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 23.
Regarding the origin of the world trade contract, see SUNGJOON CHO, THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS
OF WORLD TRADE, supra note 3, at 11–15; see also Gregory Shaffer, How the World Trade Organization
Shapes Regulatory Governance, 9 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 2 (2015).
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development of rules and regulatory proceedings.33 Importantly, second order
compliance is not a command-and-control relationship. Instead, as Gregory
Shaffer notes, these frameworks are formed through a gradual and iterative
process of adherence, break, and calcification.34
Indeed, the inherent ambiguity of key WTO terms, such as “discriminatory”
or “unjustifiable,” has rendered rationalist interpretations of regulation (such as
the “stimulus-response” model) unsatisfactory.35 These economic models make
the deceptively clear assumption that these regulatory agencies and participants
compete to create “optimal levels of enforcement.”36 In the context of collective
discussion and debate surrounding what is discriminatory or unjustifiable, this
assumption too often ignores the more subtle interpretive issues involved. Take,
for example, a hypothetical TBT inquiry brought by China. Say China has
misgivings on a new U.S. regulation related to acceptable lead levels in children’s
toys. China points to the international standard and claims that the U.S. regulation
is unjustifiable. The U.S. replies that it has its own misgivings about the validity of
the international standard. Is the U.S. discriminating against Chinese toys? If so,
is such discrimination justifiable? Answers to these questions are not
predetermined; they are subject to rhetorical processes such as argument and
persuasion within the institutional context of the TBT Committee, unless the
question is eventually adjudicated through the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism.37
The conventional model becomes even more problematic when faced with
an iterative self-regulatory process such as the TBT Committee. The TBT
Committee must develop delicate regulatory strategies that are both suitable to its
limited authority (such as peer review) and flexible enough to be accepted by
WTO members.38 In the preceding example, the U.S. may rebuff Chinese
33
34

35

36
37

38

See Shaffer, supra note 32.
“The frames, however, are not simply given. They are rather shaped over time through recursive
rounds of engagement among actors with differing epistemologies and interests at different levels
of governance. In practice, the positions taken by state representatives in the WTO are often more
of a mercantilist nature, as they defend both their export and their import-competing business
interests. This provides an opening for contestation and argumentation in which officials must
simultaneously look at their own practices when challenging others’. Government representatives
before the WTO’s network of councils and committees engage in sustained deliberation, and, in
this way, are subject to persuasion and learning.” Id. at 16.
Julien Etienne, Ambiguity and Relation Signals in Regulator-Regulatee Relationships, 7 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 30, 30 (2013).
Id.
Regarding the delicate relationship between peer review, as manifested in the TBT Committee, and
adjudication in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, see Cho, Norms and Discourse, supra note 7,
at 685.
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 25, at 97.
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entreaties. But, what about the next instance? And the instance after that? As
rounds of regulatory dialogue continue in the TBT Committee, the U.S. and China
may be able to produce some kind of regulatory rapprochement in the form of a
memorandum of understanding (MOU). With this hypothetical example in mind,
we can conceptualize the discursive nature of the WTO. Here, a discursive process
marks the most significant departure from the conventional model and requires a
new analytical framework. For example, the most salient aspects of law or legality
embedded in the regulation derive from its everyday operation.39 A domestic
regulator, which may be an importing country in the TBT context, and regulatees,
which may be foreign producers represented by exporting countries in the TBT
context, interpret and reflect on each other’s behaviors in the collective yet
uncelebrated routine interactions between them. Sometimes, they learn from each
other and form a strong partnership based on shared regulatory grounds.
Indubitably, this successful socialization augurs well in terms of effectiveness and
compliance, although they may fail some other times.
In fact, the aforementioned emphasis on a discursive, rhetorical regulatory
process is not new. Some scholars have already developed a new model of
regulatory governance in the same line. For example, the concept of “responsive
regulation” was created as a sort of “third way”: a “symbiosis between state
regulation and self-regulation,” in the context of domestic regulatory agencies
specifically.40 These domestic regulatory agencies were tasked with orienting their
activities based on “two pyramids: a hierarchy of sanctions and a hierarchy of
regulatory strategies of varying degrees of interventionism.”41 Obviously these
types of hierarchies are unavailable in the increasingly transnational business age.
With issues becoming increasingly intertwined with international politics, and
business transversing the conventional boundaries of States, domestic regulators
cannot reach out to all potential regulatees, such as foreign producers in foreign
countries.42 For that reason, “responsive regulation” as an international regulatory
concept has had to adapt to survive. The most important evolution of responsive
regulation relates to activities known as “transnational regulatory standardsetting” (TRSS).43 These activities include “orchestration,” which entails an IO

39

40
41
42
43

Garry C. Gray & Susan S. Silbey, The Other Side of the Compliance Relationship, in EXPLAINING
COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 123 (Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann
Nielsen eds., 2011) (discussing the “habitual quotidian enactment”).
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 25, at 96.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 97.
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using its own capacities to influence, encourage, and sometimes even ‘enforce’ self
or multi-stakeholder regulation.44
Furthermore, new literature has suggested that focusing on procedural
aspects of regulation could provide a palliative to the woes of present-day
regulatory bodies. Kristina Murphy et al. suggest that the “use of threat and legal
authority, particularly when perceived as unreasonable, can produce the opposite
behavior from that sought . . . [including] overt opposition.”45 Murphy et al.
propose that parties who follow out of “obligation rather than out of fear” are
more likely to comply with regulatory organizations.46 The authors conducted
several studies on domestic regulatory agencies, including a study on the
Australian social security system.47 They concluded that “procedural justice was
found to be more important for nurturing compliance when people questioned
the legitimacy of the laws they were being asked to comply with.”48 These findings
related to procedural justice illustrate that IOs must also maintain a good sense of
their own legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents. Certainly procedural justice
is a solid goal to strive for in the IO regulatory context. In this regard, the TBT
Committee operates as a forum in which such procedural justice is delivered
through transparency, notification, enquiries, and reason giving.

III. T OWARD A T HEORY OF T RANSNATIONAL
R EGULATORY C OMMUNITIZATION
As a result of the complicated transnational regulatory regime and the
failures of the conventional model to offer solutions, the need to address such
complexities through more innovative forms of regulatory discourse becomes
apparent. In this Section, we discuss an alternative model of regulatory governance
through “regulatory intermediaries,” including the role of the TBT Committee as
a regulatory intermediary. We then explore a theory of “communitization” of
international regulation, which hypothesizes that transnational participation in
regulatory discourse creates a useful social framework for understanding and
evaluating regulatory solutions.

44
45

46
47
48

Id. at 97–98.
Kristina Murphy, et al., Nurturing Regulatory Compliance: Is Procedural Justice Effective When People Question
the Legitimacy of the Law?, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 2 (2009).
Id.
Id. at 11–14.
Id. at 18.
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A. Transnational Regulatory Intermediaries (TRI)
Facing the aforementioned governance gap left by the conventional model,
we need an innovative regulatory framework under which we can experiment with
various models based on discursive regulatory processes, such as argument,
persuasion, deliberation, and learning. One promising way of thinking in this
direction comes from the concept of “orchestration,” which Kenneth Abbott et
al. developed.49 Breaking from the conventional command-and-control model,
Abbott et al. envision a middle actor (“intermediary”) that can bridge or
coordinate between an original regulator (“orchestrator”) and a regulatee
(“target”).50 In this orchestration model, a regulator (orchestrator) “creates,
supports and integrates a multi-actor system of soft and indirect governance
geared towards shared goals that neither orchestrator nor intermediaries could
achieve on their own.”51 Importantly, certain professional intermediaries possess
critical governance capacities, such as “technical expertise” and “direct access to
targets.”52 By mobilizing these epistemic advantages of those intermediaries, IOs
can orchestrate an indirect yet effective regulatory pathway in which members
(targets) coordinate their preferences to meet IOs’ normative goals.
In this regard, the TBT Committee can be deemed a “transnational
regulatory intermediary (TRI)” to the WTO (orchestrator). Notably,
“[o]rchestration can also steer . . . internal forms of governance that reflect
democratic principles and promote internal contestability, increasing the
representativeness, deliberativeness, and legitimacy.”53 In the TBT context
specifically, Article 13.1 of the TBT Agreement defines the mission of the TBT
Committee as “[f]or the purpose of affording Members the opportunity of
consulting on any matters relating to the operation of this Agreement or the
furtherance of its objectives, and [the TBT Committee] shall carry out such
responsibilities as assigned to it under this Agreement or by the Members.”
Note that the nature of discussion topics (“specific trade concerns”) in the
TBT Committee is highly technical.54 Naturally, participants of the TBT
Committee include sector-specific government officials from national regulatory
and standardizing bodies who hold technical expertise in given regulatory areas. 55

49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Abbott et al., supra note 17, at 2; Abbott, Levi-Faur & Snidal, supra note 20, at 4–5.
Abbott et al., supra note 17, at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Abbott & Snidal (2013), supra note 25, at 107.
WTO, Technical Barriers to Trade, https://perma.cc/4AK7-QEAA (last visited May 9, 2016).
WTO, THE WTO AGREEMENTS SERIES: TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 28 (2014).
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The TBT Committee’s characteristic “operational capacity”56 includes providing a
peer review forum for WTO members, socializing them within the context of the
TBT community, and eventually facilitating their implementation of the TBT
Agreement. Importantly, the TBT Committee retains a direct—not necessarily
diplomatic, yet more importantly professional—access to targets, such as issuespecific domestic authorities subject to the TBT disciplines.57 This epistemic
connection is critical in securing the effective implementation of, or compliance
with, the TBT Agreement by WTO members.58
Certainly the TRI model is based on certain assumptions. One of the key
assumptions is that the parties are working—in good faith—within a structure
that actually has the capacity to support the collaborative development of
regulations. Christine Parker appropriately characterizes these assumptions as
significant facial challenges to the theory of responsive regulation.59 Is this, as
Parker herself asks, too optimistic a presumption to form the basis of a coherent
and persuasive regulatory regime?60 Why would any State choose to be involved
with, much less adhere to, such a complex system?
To answer these questions in turn, we first think this presumption might not
be overly optimistic. Assuredly, some noncompliance occurs. Yet the open nature
of promulgating these regulations, with repeated interactions allowing for group
learning and consensus-building on a global basis, incentivizes continued
participation. Second, the complexity of an IO regulatory system encourages
further State participation precisely because it is discursive. Its variable nature
ensures that States will always find one reason or another to work within the
international system. In this regard, the TBT Committee tends to warrant the TRI
model assumption.
As a regulatory intermediary, the TBT Committee does not directly
command WTO members’ compliance with TBT obligations or discipline
violations. Rather, the TBT Committee provides a discursive forum in which
WTO members can freely exchange information on their regulatory experiences,
56
57
58

59

60

Abbott, Levi-Faur, & Snidal, supra note 20, at 6.
Id.
Shaffer, supra note 32, at 1 (highlighting the WTO’s transnational regulatory governance that affects
“changes in professional expertise engaging with state regulation”).
“[Responsive regulation] tends to assume that the kind of social relationships, opportunities for
free and equal deliberation, and substantively just law that it seeks to create already exist. . . . That
is, responsive regulation assumes that there are enough regulators, regulated businesses and third
parties who are genuinely committed to the public interest, willing and able to communicate with
one another to resolve problems, imaginative enough to come up with ‘win win’ solutions to make
it possible and that they then have sufficient capacity and an appropriate substantively just law to
enable them to implement those solutions.” Christine Parker, Twenty Years of Responsive Regulation:
An Appreciation and Appraisal, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 2, 9 (2013).
Id.
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raise questions on any problematic regulatory practices, persuade other members
into better regulatory practices, clarify or defend their own regulatory decisions,
and eventually nurture a culture of cooperation among members in the TBT area.61
This non-hierarchical mode of governance is effective in the sense that the TBT
Committee can acculturate WTO members to the normative goals of the TBT
Agreement, i.e., reconciliation between regulatory autonomy and free trade values.
The TBT Committee often resolves disputes before they escalate and reach the
WTO tribunal for formal adjudication. Indeed, this “forward-looking” nature, in
other words, early detection of trade disputes and their diffusion in a preemptive
manner via dialogue, is characteristic of the TBT Committee.62 The steady rise of
the number of specific trade concerns raised in the TBT Committee annually,
from four in 1995 to ninety-four in 2012, eloquently demonstrates members’
perception of effectiveness, and therefore their trust in this indirect, nonhierarchical mode of governance.63
Admittedly, the TBT Committee might diverge from typical intermediaries
in that the WTO did not actually coopt or outsource (“enlist”) it, as it did in the
case of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) under the TBT
Agreement.64 In contrast, the WTO “insourced” the TBT Committee as it
formally institutionalized it in the TBT Agreement.65 In this regard, one might be
tempted to characterize the relationship between the WTO and the TBT
Committee as “delegation” in terms of a principal-agent relationship.
Nonetheless, the WTO does not directly control day-to-day operations of the
TBT Committee, nor is their relationship borne by a contract.66 The TBT
Committee retains a fairly independent space in its operation from the direct
control of the WTO (the General Council). Moreover, the WTO provides the
TBT Committee with both “material” (budget and personnel) and “ideational”
(institutionalization) support.67 In sum, orchestration appears to be a better
characterization of the relationship between the WTO and the TBT Committee.
Interestingly, what distinguishes the TBT Committee from other types of
intermediaries is its “(soft)-rulemaking” function. For example, in its triennial
61

62
63

64
65
66

67

See Abbott, Levi-Faur, & Snidal, supra note 20, at 1 (observing that intermediaries can play a role in
“building communities of assurances, trust and compliance”).
THE WTO AGREEMENTS SERIES, supra note 55, at 32.
Id. at 29; Record Number of New Trade Concerns Raised in Standards Committee in 2014, WTO NEWS (Nov.
4–6, 2014).
Abbott et al., supra note 17, at 8.
TBT Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 13.
For example, the TBT Committee is enabled to make an independent decision in granting
developing countries “specified, time-limited exceptions” from the TBT obligations. Id. at art. 12.8.
Id. at art. 13. (“The Committee . . . shall carry out such responsibilities as assigned to it under this
Agreement or by the Members.”).
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review mandated in Article 15.4 of the TBT Agreement, the TBT Committee
developed a variety of targeted soft-law products, such as guidelines or
recommendations, in areas of international standards and good regulatory
practices.68 These guidelines and recommendations are voluntary and sectorspecific. Admittedly, this soft lawmaking is not so much new rulemaking from
scratch as it is a “translation” of existing norms, such as the TBT Agreement.69 In
2012, the TBT Committee agreed to establish a voluntary mechanism to promote
good regulatory practice by “assessing policy options, including the need to
regulate (e.g. how to evaluate the impact of alternatives through an evidence-based
process, including through the use of regulatory impact assessment (RIA)
tools).”70 Needless to say, this rulemaking function of the TBT Committee
facilitates WTO members’ implementation of the TBT Agreement, which aligns
with the WTO’s main goal. In this sense, the TBT Agreement tends to confirm
the “intermediary availability hypothesis,” which predicts that “governance actors
are more likely to orchestrate when intermediaries with correlated goals and
complementary capabilities are available,” as well as the “orchestrator focality
hypothesis,” which predicts that “governance actors are more likely to orchestrate
when they are focal within the relevant issue area.”71
In sum, the orchestration model departs from the so-called “Old
Governance”72 framework (that is, the hierarchical, top-down regulatory model
via treaties and intergovernmental organizations) in another critical aspect. While
the conventional model views an IO as a tool for Member States in pursuing
certain regulatory goals, the orchestration model defines an IO as an autonomous
actor that plans the orchestration and recruits intermediaries in a strategic sense.

B. TRI and International Regulatory Communitization
Departing from the conventional command-and-control (enforcement)
model, transnational regulatory communitization focuses on “communication,”
which connotes learning, tolerance, and acculturation among transnational
regulators and regulatees within the TBT context. This social framework is
particularly useful in understanding and evaluating regulatory solutions between

68
69
70

71
72

THE WTO AGREEMENTS SERIES, supra note 55, at 30.
Abbott, Levi-Faur & Snidal, supra note 20, at 9.
WTO, Sixth Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade Under Article 15.4, G/TBT/32, 29 November 2012, ¶ 4.
Abbott et al., supra note 17, at 15.
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New
Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 520–32 (2009).
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transnational regulators and regulatees in a situation where the conventional
centralized regulatory authority is absent.73
Notably, the TBT Agreement concerns meta-regulation in the sense that TBT
aims to regulate WTO members’ technical regulations through various means.
Most of these means are “procedural” in nature in that TBT requires WTO
members to take a certain course of action or procedure, rather than prescribing
substantive criteria to be met. As Ayres and Braithwaite described as the “minimal
sufficiency” principle, “the more regulation relies on moral suasion rather than
punishment, the more effective it will be, especially at inducing internalization and
thus long-term compliance.”74 For example, the TBT agreement requires WTO
members to publish and notify its new TBT measures in a timely manner as well
as to respond to inquiries from other members concerning such measures.75
Indeed, many of those procedural obligations are performed in the peer review
under the auspices of the TBT Committee.
The regulatory core of these procedural provisions—transparency—
eloquently demonstrates a “public” nature of the TBT regime. Rather than
bilaterally disposing of regulatory issues between complaining and responding
parties, it shares and “communitizes” regulatory problems among WTO
members. In this regard, a regulatory “solution” under this communitization
model is distinguishable from that of a conventional solution. If the latter
concerns a binary notion of full compliance (repeal of a measure in question)
versus violation (maintenance of the measure), the former envisions a spectrum
of constructive, if not dramatic, behaviors, including enhanced cooperation
toward better understanding of one’s regulatory goals and information sharing.
Indeed, many of the titular violations under the conventional view may be
unintentional due to lack of information or capacity, as Chayes and Chayes
emphasized in their “management” model of international regulation.76 Under
these circumstances, cooperation based on dialogue can be a better solution than
coercion or retaliation. Likewise, respondents (regulating countries) tend to value
the opportunity to defend their positions within the institution (the TBT
Committee) regardless of whether their justifications are accepted. These noninstrumental factors, which may be labeled “relational criteria,” enhance the
general sense of fairness and legitimacy among WTO members and therefore
contribute to the WTO governance.77
73
74
75
76
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Gray & Silbey, supra note 39, at 123.
Abbott & Snidal (2013), supra note 25, at 107.
TBT Agreement, supra note 5, at arts. 10, 13.
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 276 (2006).
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For the purpose of this project, we define “solution” as some level of
understanding/satisfaction that would be enough to stop the original inquiring
party from pursuing any further action in a given matter. By this, we might be able
to claim that parties concerned have reached some kind of mutual understanding
via communication. Then, we can identify what kinds of factors contribute to such
solutions.78 This redefinition of solution may even accommodate regulatory
tolerance, in addition to conformity.
The aforementioned communitization model and its new notion of
regulatory solution gain particular traction in the era of uncertainty. While this
uncertainty itself constitutes a daunting challenge to the global trading system,
diverging modes of addressing such uncertainty among WTO members may
function as serious trade barriers. For example, some WTO members may be
more risk-averse than others in responding to scientific uncertainty in regulating
genetically modified organisms or hormone-treated beef. In this situation,
providing market participants (producers, consumers, investors) with adequate
information is vital in adequately communicating regulatory risks involved in
global trade.79 The communitization model corresponds to this emerging need in
the trade and regulation nexus.

IV. A C ASE S T UDY : T HE WTO TBT C OMMITTEE
Given our departure from the conventional model as it becomes increasingly
unsuitable to address contemporary trade realities, we must evaluate the
alternative model of regulatory governance via regulatory intermediaries by
attempting to measure the effectiveness, if any, of communitization. Here, we test
the theory of international regulatory communitization by applying it to the TBT
Committee and attempting to measure, and evaluate, the Committee’s
effectiveness as a regulatory intermediary.

A. Measuring
the
Effectiveness
Regulatory Intermediary

of

a

Transnational

As discussed above, the TBT Committee’s unique epistemic advantages
qualify the Committee to be characterized as a regulatory intermediary. Its
technical nature is attested to by the fact that the WTO delegations in Geneva

78

79

Such factors include the subject matter, parties concerned (developing or developed countries etc.),
number of parties concerned, whether a notification triggered the inquiry, duration of
communication, etc.
The Application of Risk Communication to Food Standards and Safety Matters, WHO (1998),
https://perma.cc/MS2F-ZQUG.
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often bring experts from their headquarters to the Committee meetings.80 Also,
its workman-like operation allows the Committee to often be chaired by secondlevel Geneva-based diplomats, while participants facilitate their communication
by refraining from the use of legalese.81 Its professionalism, which might translate
into de-politicization, tends to self-legitimate its operation, as evidenced by its
ever-increasing use by WTO members.
Figure 1: Review of Measures by TBT Committee82

Despite its obvious popularity, measuring a TRI’s actual effectiveness still
appears challenging. Notably, Abbott et al. aptly observe that:
[E]ffectiveness is difficult to evaluate, because one must determine what goals
are being pursued and consider the counterfactuals: what might have
happened without orchestration and what alternative governance strategies
might have achieved. Such factors are easier to evaluate in specific cases,
where experts with detailed case knowledge can consider such contextual
circumstances.83
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Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis, & Erik N. Wijkstrom, In the Shadow of the DSU: Addressing Specific
Trade Concerns in the WTO SPS and TBT Committees, 47 J. WORLD TRADE 729, 754 (2013).
Id. It should be noted that the TBT does not ban the use of such legalese per se, but the TBT
Committee does emphasize the importance of efficiency and streamlining TBT Committee
discussions. In 2009, for example, in response to the “accelerated growth” in the number of STCs
raised at TBT Committee meetings, as well as in the number of WTO Members raising concerns
or substantively supporting other Member’s concerns, the TBT Committee emphasized the
importance of making communications among Members more efficient. See WTO, Minutes of the
Meeting of November 13, 2009, G/TBT/26 (Nov. 13, 2009), ¶¶ 67–68.
WTO, Sixth Triennial Review, supra note 70, at 10.
Abbott et al., supra note 17, at 21.
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Therefore, in evaluating the effectiveness of the TBT Committee qua
intermediary one must consider its discursive format and normative goal of
transparency.84 In other words, within the context of the TBT Committee, one
might attempt to assess its effectiveness through inquiries and responses and their
consequences. Note that those consequences do not necessarily entail compliant
behavioral changes from WTO members. They also include expressions of
satisfaction, explicit or implicit through acquiescence, from inquiring members.
Here, one must understand the fundamental “relational” nature of TBT
regulation. Although there are certain prescriptive rules, both substantive and
procedural, under the TBT Agreement, those rules are triggered if, and only if, a
certain WTO member raises an issue concerning them, for example in terms of a
“specific trade concern.”85 There is no centralized review mechanism governed
directly by the WTO General Council or the Secretariat. If a particular response
indeed satisfies the original inquirer, there will be no more discussion or dispute.
In this regard, the TBT Committee is a regulatory “clearinghouse” that channels
and manages TBT-related inquiries that exist in the form of both a demand for
clarification and a complaint about alleged illegality.86 Unlike adjudication through
the WTO tribunal, the ultimate goal of the TBT Committee is to liquidate those
grievances by providing a discursive forum. In this sense, the TBT Committee
may function as a dispute “prevention” mechanism.87
Given that the main regulatory focus under the TBT Committee lies in
procedural—rather than substantive—disciplines, such as transparency, it would
be infeasible to define “regulatory specifications”88 that may function as baselines
in evaluating effectiveness of the TBT Committee’s contribution to the attainment
of such procedural disciplines. Rather, as a meta-regulation, the TBT regulation
monitored by the TBT Committee can be characterized as “relational regulation”
that aims to manage compliant behaviors within an “acceptable range of
variation,” rather than completely eliminating the gap between an ideal regulatory
status and actual performance.89 As an “ongoing production of organizational and
material life through a network of interdependent human transactions,” the TBT
Committee embraces the “impossibility of perfect conformity between
abstract . . . rules . . . and situated action.”90 Here, regulatory dialogue, such as
84
85
86
87

88
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90

Id.
See TBT Information Management System, supra note 13.
Horn et al., supra note 80, at 730.
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE WTO AND TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 573–74 (Tracey Epps
& Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013).
Ruthanne Huising & Susan S. Silbey, Governing the Gap: Forging Safe Science through Relational Regulation,
5 REG. & GOVERNANCE 14, 14 (2011).
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 16.
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inquiries and responses, form an essential toolkit for governing compliance with
those procedural regulations (such as transparency and notification) under the
TBT Agreement.

B. The Data
Measuring the overall effectiveness of the TBT Committee requires a
nuanced understanding of “resolution.” The only relevant reference available in
this regard is Horn et al.’s definition of resolution under the TBT Committee.
Their definition of resolution is rather liberal. They observe that:
In the . . . TBT Committee[ ], a Member, or a group of Members, engage in
a dialogue with other Member(s) concerning a specific policy measure; there
is an exchange of information and views, and concerned Member(s) can rest
the case if they so desire, for instance if they are sufficiently convinced
concerning the legality of the measure; or, they can request a change in the
contested measure—or in the light of explanations and clarification the
challenging Members may decide not to pursue the matter further. As a result
of the information obtained, or of the change in the policy, the concerned
Member may decide on its own that the matter has been resolved, even
though similar decisions are void of any formalism. Thus, some form of
settlement takes place also in the case of STCs.91

Although their definition of resolution appears plausible, its explanatory
force remains limited as a proxy of effectiveness, in particular within the unique
context of the TBT Committee as a regulatory intermediary. The TBT-specific
effectiveness concerns not so much any radical convergence or harmonization
toward a particular regulatory standard as it does a “communitization” of
regulatory concerns. Such communitization involves a deep understanding of
others’ regulatory situations, concretization of any differences, exploration of
possible common grounds, and minimization, if not elimination, of negative trade
impacts. Indeed, various procedural obligations under the TBT Agreement, such
as transparency, notification, and reason giving, tend to warrant this
communitization goal by collectivizing particular trade-regulatory concerns and
sharing them among WTO members in a discursive fashion.92
Against this background, we coded over 400 specific trade concerns (STCs)
collected from the WTO TBT website93 according to the following sequence and
criteria: first, we categorized main dialogues (communications) on STCs within
the TBT Committee.

91
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Horn et al., supra note 80, at 749.
Cho, Norms and Discourse, supra note 7, at 700 (“[B]y framing their inquiries and responses within the
context and terms of WTO norms, both an inquirer and a respondent transmit WTO norms to
each other.”).
WTO, Technical Barriers to Trade, supra note 54.
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Table 1: Communication Codes on STCs within the TBT Committee
Code
Category
AS
some state would be adopting an international standard
C
TBT complaint
CC
complaint was ongoing
CL
complaint about legitimacy (of a measure)
CN
complaint about lack of required notification
CUN
complaint that measure was unnecessary for stated goal
D
delay
IS
invoked international standards
K
committee would continue to work
R
the response
RI
member requesting more information
RV
measure was voluntary instrument; not subject to TBT
S
solution had been reached
S?
solution seemed unclear
SC
solution had to be clarified
SCO
solution was for parties to have further communication
SX
solution required some sort of change
WO
some state was withholding its opinion
Based on this categorization, we classified all STCs into two groups: (1)
resolved and (2) not resolved. For example, “S” or “SCO” can be classified as
resolved, while “D” or “SC” is classified as unresolved. Some styled typologies
can illustrate our classifications. First, “resolved” connotes the following patterns:
1.) State X requests State Y provide information. State Y agrees to provide
a direct answer in the form of more recent information and to refer remaining
questions to State Y’s authorities for further replies.94
a. Example: Data Point (DP) 3 – Mexico
2.) State X requests State Y provide information. State Y, either
immediately or at some later time, tells the Committee that State Y has
provided a direct response to State X and will provide similar responses
bilaterally.
a. Example: DP 204 – EC

94

This follows Horn et al.’s definition of “resolution” in that we are not looking at a formalistic
“resolution” (i.e., not all problems are completely resolved), but rather that some agreeable progress
has been made between the parties.
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3.) State X requests State Y to provide information. State Y, either
immediately or at some later time, tells the Committee that State Y and State
X will continue discussions bilaterally.
a. Example: DP 4 – U.S.
4.) State X requests postponement of standards implementation or other
measures by State Y. State Y either [1] agrees in part, or [2] expresses a
willingness to discuss the matter further bilaterally.95
a. Example: DP 106 – U.S.
5.) State X voices a concern with State Y’s standard. State Y [1] notes that
State X’s issue has been brought before State Y’s authorities; [2] provides
some sort of explanation; and/or [3] informs State X that the specific concern
will be addressed and a determination made soon.96
a. Example: DP 255 – Israel

In contrast, “unresolved” connotes the following patterns:
1.) State X requests State Y provide information. State Y refuses to provide
that information or says that State Y cannot provide that information at the
present time.
a. Example: DP 4 – U.S.
2.) State X voices a concern about State Y’s proposed or adopted standard.
State Y counters by justifying State Y’s regulation or otherwise dismissing
State X’s concern. (Optional: State X expresses dissatisfaction with State Y’s
answer.)
a. Example: DP 6 – EC
3.) State X voices a concern about State Y’s standard. State Y takes note
of State X’s concern, but takes no further action.97
a. Example: DP 155 – China
4.) State X voices a concern about State Y’s standard. After repeated
discussion, State X still believes, or a third country (State Z) believes, that the
standard is unfairly biased.98
a. Example: DP 135 – Norway
5.) State X voices a concern about State Y’s standard. After some
discussion, State Y merely reiterates that the regulation has not been fully
decided upon yet.99
a. Example: DP 303 – Indonesia

Furthermore, we classified all the STCs into two large groups in accordance
with the “motivation” of initial inquiries: seeking information/clarification or
remedial changes. In our database, the code for the first occasion is “CN”; the
code for the second one is “CL.” However, some STCs may not have either code,
95
96

97
98
99

This partial resolution follows our broader definition of “resolution.”
Here, we illustrate that one of our primary considerations is the reconciliatory mechanism, rather
than the ultimate policy change, inherent in the TBT process.
Here, the response is in fact a “cutting off” of communication.
Within our typology, this type represents an insufficient resolution.
This primarily represents a delaying tactic distinguished from the “Yes” type that also includes
invitation or solicitation for more discussion, either bilaterally or through the TBT committee.
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in which case we should give them one. Our presumption is that there is both a
legality and a clarification purpose to almost all TBT inquiries. Very few are purely
one or the other, though we have observed among “friendly” states that there is
occasionally a pure question by State X as to what State Y intends. So, in the
typology below, we operate on the presumption that one or the other
predominates. “Legality” connotes the following patterns:
1.) State X challenges State Y’s standard on the basis that it does not
conform with international standards.100
a. Example: DP 11 – Canada
2.) State X believes State Y’s standard is an unnecessary obstacle to trade
under the existing rules/agreements.
a. Example: DP 197 – Germany
3.) State X draws attention to State Y’s pending or proposed regulations
and states that they believe they are unacceptable under present international
standards/are illegal under present standards.101
a. Example: DP 206 – EC

“Clarification” connotes the following patterns:
1.) State X requests information about the application of State Y’s
standard.
a. Example: DP 23 – Korea
2.) State X draws attention to State Y’s pending or proposed regulations
and asks whether they will be altered based on State X’s or State Z’s
comments.
a. Example: DP 201 – China
3.) State X notes that it is waiting on State Y’s response to a previously
raised issue.102
a. Example: DP 24 – Mexico

Finally, according to Horn et al., “serious” STCs are those resulting in two
or more committee meetings. However, our database focuses on the “frequency”
or the number of relays or communications between inquirers and respondents.
Against this background, we developed the following hypotheses:
1.) The higher the level of conflict an STC demonstrates, defined by the
number of WTO members involved, the less likely it is to be eventually
resolved or satisfied
2.) The more frequently WTO members discuss a particular regulatory
issue (STC), the less likely it is to be resolved.
3.) A clarification request from a potential regulatee is more likely to
produce a solution, or resolution (satisfaction), than an illegality complaint.

100

101

102

While the phraseology is relatively gentle, the fundamental issue is that there is an existing standard
that Norway believes does not conform.
Here, the underlying motivation is to merely challenge the proposed regulation rather than to get a
response regarding an already challenged regulation.
In this instance, even if the original basis was legality, the present motivation is clarification.
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C. Analysis
We begin with a notable caveat.
Figure 2: Pearson’s r Correlation:
L
Level of
Conflict ("L")
Frequency
("F")
Motivation
("M")
Resolution
("R")

F

M

R

1
0.516775

1

0.130437

0.149691

1

-0.09264

-0.13684

-0.22882

1

Figure 2 shows a Pearson’s r correlation output—a correlation typified by
linear dependence—among all variables. As illustrated, L, F, and M are only
weakly correlated with R. Nonetheless, this Figure does demonstrate the existence
of linear relationships of varying degrees. This means that we can demonstrate
some relationship between the variables, albeit not a strong relationship. Take, for
example, the relationship between Motivation (M) and Resolution (R). We can see
that there is a weak negative relationship between these variables. That is to say,
from the correlation coefficient we can see that a “legality” motivation, as opposed
to a “clarification” motivation, is more likely to produce a result that does not end
in successful resolution, as defined by our typology.
Admittedly, this correlation alone does not tell us what amount of change
these variables cause in one another. In essence, it still does not tell us the extent
of their relationship. Nor does it tell us if this relationship is statistically significant.
To accomplish that goal, we proceeded with single linear regressions and a
multiple regression with Level of Conflict (L), Frequency (F), and Motivation (M)
as X to our common Y, Resolution (R).
Figure 3: X = L (Level of Conflict)
SUMMARY
OUTPUT
Regression
Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R
Square
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0.09263837
1
0.00858186
8
0.00612786
3
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Standard
Error
Observation
s

0.48041376
2
406

ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
Level of
Conflict - Types of
Countries Involved
(E.U./U.S. = 4; BRIC
= 3; Regional = 2;
LDC = 1; Other or
N/A = 0)

1
404
405

SS

MS

0.80711833
93.2421428
94.0492611

0.807118
0.230797

Coefficients
0.698150542

-0.005552939
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F
3.49708
6

Significance
F
0.0621998
7

Standard
Error
0.04113396

t Stat
16.97261

P-value
3.68E-49

0.00296941

-1.87005

0.0622
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Level of Conflict - Types of Countries Involved (EU/US
= 4; BRIC = 3; Regional = 2; LDC = 1; Other or N/A = 0)
Line Fit Plot
Resolved? (Yes = 1, No = 0)

2.5
2
1.5
Resolved? (Yes = 1, No = 0)
1
Predicted Resolved? (Yes = 1,
No = 0)

0.5
0
0

20

40

60

80

Level of Conflict - Types of Countries Involved (EU/US = 4; BRIC = 3;
Regional = 2; LDC = 1; Other or N/A = 0)

Figure 3 shows the output of a linear regression where X is Level of Conflict
(L)103 and Y is Resolution (R). L represents the weakest relationship with R. As
noted by Figure 2, L had an extremely weak negative correlation with R of
approximately -.09. Linear regression illustrates how much change in R is due to
L—here, approximately .008, or 0.8 percent. Interestingly, the coefficient value
demonstrates that with each point increase (e.g., 1 to 2) in L, the likelihood of R
actually increases by .05 percent. Additionally, the p-value of approximately .0622
is below our 90 percent confidence interval of .10.
At first blush, these results seem to show that we can be 90 percent
confident, or greater,104 that Level of Conflict (L) is the variable actually causing
the 0.8 percent of change we noted above. Specifically, it indicates that each single
unit increase in Level of Conflict actually increases the likelihood of resolution by
.05 percent. However, as will be demonstrated below in Figure 6, we cannot
ultimately use these results because they are not statistically significant when
compared alongside the other variables. For that reason, we cannot support our
first hypothesis that the higher the level of conflict an STC demonstrates, defined

103

104

This is coded per the above as the relative ‘weight’ given an issue by number of countries and their
economic significance.
This is the commonly accepted standard for statistical significance.
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by the number of WTO members involved, the less likely it is to be eventually
resolved or satisfied.
Figure 4: X=F (Frequency)
SUMMARY
OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.136842
0.018726
0.016297
0.47795
406

ANOVA
df
1
404
405

Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
Frequency (# of
Times Raised)

SS
1.761151
92.28811
94.04926

MS
1.761151
0.228436

F
7.709605

Coefficients

Standard Error

0.712411

0.036477

19.53058

2.69E-60

-0.0284

0.010228

-2.77662

0.005748
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t Stat

Significance F
0.00574838

P-value
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Frequency (Number of Times Raised)
Line Fit Plot

Resolved? (Yes = 1, No = 0)

2

1.5

1

Resolved? (Yes = 1, No = 0)
Predicted Resolved? (Yes = 1,
No = 0)

0.5

0
0

5

10

15

Frequency (Number of Times Raised)

Figure 4 shows the output of a linear regression where X is Frequency (the
number of times a given issue was raised) and Y is Resolution. In the above, Figure
2 illustrated that F also has a very slight negative correlation with R—
approximately -0.16. Linear regression demonstrates that about 1.6% of the
variance in R is explained by the F at which an issue is raised.
As an initial matter, the p-value of .005 shows that our results were not a
chance occurrence. That is, these results seemed to indicate that we could be
confident, above a 95 percent chance, that the 1.3 percent lesser likelihood in
Resolution (R) was the result of an increase in the Frequency (F) with which a
given issue was raised. Furthermore, we can see from our coefficient of
approximately -0.02 that for each time an issue is raised, the likelihood of
Resolution goes down by 2 percent. After conducting a multiple regression (see
Figure 6) we note that the single regression above in Figure 4 was absorbing some
explanatory value from untested variables. For that reason, we must reduce our
confidence interval to 90 percent. However, we can still be confident that the data
supports our second hypothesis.
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Figure 5: X=M (Motivation)
SUMMARY
OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.228817
0.052357
0.050012
0.469688
406

ANOVA
df
1
404
405

Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
Motivation
(Legality = 1;
Clarification = 0)

SS
4.924162
89.1251
94.04926

MS
4.924162
0.220607

F
22.321

Significance F
3.1888E-06

Coefficients
0.761364

Standard
Error
0.035404

t Stat
21.50498

P-value
6.27E-69

-0.22223

0.047038

-4.72451

3.19E-06

Resolved? (Yes = 1, No = 0)

Motivation (Legality = 1; Clarification = 0)
Line Fit Plot
2.5
2
1.5

Resolved? (Yes = 1, No = 0)

1
Predicted Resolved? (Yes =
1, No = 0)

0.5
0
0

0.5

1

1.5

Motivation (Legality = 1; Clarification = 0)
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Figure 5 shows the output of a linear regression where X is Motivation
(legality v. clarification) and Y is Resolution. As noted above, Figure 2 showed a
slight negative correlation of approximately -.2 between M and R. Linear
regression shows that M accounts for approximately .05, or 5 percent, of the
change in R. Moreover, our p-value of 3.19E-06 shows that this result is unlikely
to have occurred by chance.
Here, our p-value is substantially smaller than the 95 percent threshold
discussed previously. For that reason, we can assert that this 5 percent observed
negative change is statistically significant. Further, we can conclude due to our
coefficient that a Legality motivation makes a Resolution approximately 22
percent less likely to occur. This means that we can support our third hypothesis:
that a legality challenge, rather than a motivation desiring clarification of a given
issue, is less likely to result in a resolution among the parties.
Figure 6: Multiple Regression (All Xs – L, F, M)
SUMMARY
OUTPUT
Regression
Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R
Square
Standard
Error
Observation
s

0.25155
0.063278
0.05628
7
0.468134
406

ANOVA
df
Regression

3

Residual

402

Total

405
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SS
5.95120312
1
88.0980579
6
94.0492610
8
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M
S
1.98373
4
0.21914
9

F
9.05197
3

Significance
F
8.21122E
-06
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0.81697

Standard
Error
0.04700581
3

-0.00087

0.00338645

-0.25724

0.797127

-0.02024

0.01175677
4

-1.72195

0.085848

-0.20621

0.04751049

-4.3403

1.8E-05

Coefficients
Intercept
Level of
Conflict - Types
of Countries
Involved
(E.U./U.S. = 4;
BRIC = 3;
Regional = 2;
LDC = 1; Other
or N/A = 0)
Frequency
(# of Times
Raised)
Motivation
(Legality = 1;
Clarification = 0)

t Stat

P-value

17.38018

7.25E-51

The multiple regression provides further clarity as to the overall model we
have composed. As shown by the p-value associated with L, approximately 0.79,
we must change our initial conclusion. We cannot support our hypothesis that a
higher level of conflict results in a lesser amount of issue resolution at any
reasonable confidence level.
However, as discussed above, the multiple regression indicates that we can
support our hypothesis that an issue being raised more often (frequency) results
in a lower rate of resolution at a 90 percent, rather than 95 percent, confidence
level. The associated p-value—approximately .08—has increased due to the
multiple regression function, so our confidence level must decrease. Yet this is
still a statistically significant value. We can therefore state, due to a coefficient of
-0.02, that each increase in Frequency amounts to a 2 percent lesser likelihood of
resolution.
The reason for these changes is that the multiple regression looks into the
explanatory value of the variables together. In doing so, it eliminates the bias inherent
in single regressions that the single independent variable being tested is “soaking
up” explanatory value from independent variables not being tested; here, those
would be Level of Conflict and Motivation.
Most substantially, the p-value of Motivation in the multiple regression is
1.8E-5. Therefore, we can confirm within a 95 percent certainty our hypothesis
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that a Legality inquiry, rather than a clarification inquiry, negatively affects the
likelihood of resolution in a given instance. Our coefficient (approximately -0.2)
indicates that a Legality claim results in a 20 percent lesser likelihood of Resolution
of a given issue.

D. Explanations and Projections
From these results, we can make several projections about the use of a
transnational regulatory intermediary (TRI) as a new model of transnational
regulatory governance. Our results appear to support the new model in a few key
respects.
We can infer from the first result that having prominent WTO members
(such as the U.S. and the E.U.) involved may actually increase the possibility of
resolving STCs. Our hypothesis that a greater level of conflict would contribute
to a smaller likelihood of resolution was not supported by the data. We can posit
that this result occurred because those members enjoy high regulatory capacity
and therefore can bring useful information instrumental to regulatory deliberation
to the TBT Committee. This may translate into a form of “communitization” of
regulatory problems since what these developed country members offer
eventually contributes to the resolution of potential disputes. At a micro level,
social learning and capacity building may have happened between developed and
developing country members in discussing particular STCs, which tends to
generate resolution. Similarly, the level of conflict may also evidence a greater
number of countries involved in a given issue. Therefore, in a strictly mathematical
sense, the issue is being further communitized by greater group participation.
As to the second result, as discussed above, we can support our initial
hypothesis that more frequent discussions on an issue means a smaller likelihood
of resolution. However, that likelihood was only reduced by 2 percent, a fairly
negligible number even among the complexity of modeling human behavior. For
that reason, we pose a new hypothesis related to frequency of interaction. Rather
than merely reflecting potential inextricability of underlying regulatory challenges,
the frequency of interaction may further the communitization of these regulatory
issues. Frequency of communication intuitively results in more persistent and
productive avenues for dialogue. In point of fact, in an anecdotal sense, issues
were sometimes “cut off” from resolution in the meeting minutes by a perfunctory
denial of dialogue. Therefore, openness to further discussion contributes to the
TBT process in a far more complex way than representing a failure to reach a
resolution. Perhaps, we may speculate that the frequency of interaction
demonstrates the depth of regulatory dialogue and understanding among WTO
members over particular STCs, even in the absence of a satisfactory result.
Finally, the third result appears to be relatively clear. This clearly
substantiates the effectiveness of the new model. Note that “legality” inquiries
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tend to symbolize the old model based on formalism and enforcement. States that
make legality inquiries are relying on an outdated language system for bringing
issues before the newly communitized regulatory regime. Conversely,
“clarification” inquiries appear to create a better discursive sphere than
legalization inquiries. Requests for clarification are perhaps best characterized as
more collaborative and less confrontational. For that reason, inquiries under the
new model appear to be significantly more successful.

V. C ONCLUSION
Our conclusions illustrate the need for a new explanatory model. The
conventional command-and-control theories related to regulatory requirements
fall away in the face of IO regulatory bodies such as the WTO and the TBT
Committee. Instead, a novel method must be developed that prioritizes and
recognizes the discursive nature of international regulatory proceedings. Our
findings that Motivation—Legality versus Clarification—makes a difference in the
ultimate Resolution of an inquiry illustrates that the way regulatory problems are
discussed, and thus communitized, affects the way parties ultimately reconcile.
What remains is to continue pursuing, and improving, methods of analyzing this
regulatory discourse.
In particular, given the highly complex nature of regulatory discourse, more
qualitative methods, such as interviewing actual participants of the TBT
Committee meetings, are called for in an effort to contextualize the quantitative
result demonstrated in this article and to better understand why legality inquiries
nevertheless persist as a method of discourse for certain states. Considering that
most STCs peer-reviewed under the TBT Committee are those “in the
pipeline,”105 one might postulate that by electing a legality inquiry, as opposed to
a clarification inquiry, the inquiring member might intend to signal a more serious
message to the regulating member, as the former would hope for a possible
modification or repeal of the STC in question.
Annex: Coding Results and Statistical Analysis106

105
106

WTO, Technical Barriers to Trade, available at https://perma.cc/7LKQ-JSWV.
Coding Results and Statistical Analysis (on file with authors and the Chicago Journal of International
Law).
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